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Navigating the social world requires the ability to maintain and manipulate information
about people’s beliefs, traits, and mental states. We characterize this capacity as social
working memory (SWM). To date, very little research has explored this phenomenon, in
part because of the assumption that general working memory systems would support
working memory for social information. Various lines of research, however, suggest that
social cognitive processing relies on a neurocognitive network (i.e., the “mentalizing net-
work”) that is functionally distinct from, and considered antagonistic with, the canonical
working memory network. Here, we review evidence suggesting that demanding social
cognition requires SWM and that both the mentalizing and canonical working memory neu-
rocognitive networks support SWM. The neural data run counter to the common finding
of parametric decreases in mentalizing regions as a function of working memory demand
and suggest that the mentalizing network can support demanding cognition, when it is
demanding social cognition. Implications for individual differences in social cognition and
pathologies of social cognition are discussed.
Keywords: mentalizing, working memory, default mode network, social neuroscience, social cognitive affective
neuroscience
Whether keeping track of friends’ perspectives during conversa-
tion, a roomful of colleagues’ beliefs during a conference, or the
political ideology of someone we just met, we constantly juggle
social cognitive information. Smooth social interaction requires
keeping track of various amounts of social information, such as the
particular characteristics and relationships among people. Indeed,
the “social brain hypothesis” suggests that the fundamental evolu-
tionary constraint leading to increased human brain size, relative
to body size, was the need to manage social cognitive demands
(Dunbar, 1998).
In cognitive psychology, the process commonly associated with
holding multiple pieces of information in mind simultaneously
is known as working memory. While there is a great deal of
research on the brain mechanisms guiding working memory, tests
of working memory have almost exclusively focused on cognitive
or perceptual information and have not examined social working
memory (SWM) for the kinds of social cognitive information that
is important for successful social interaction. There are at least
two critical barriers that likely prevented research on SWM in
the past. First, past research finds similar patterns of behavioral
performance across social and non-social cognitive processing
demands (Kinderman et al., 1998; German and Hehman, 2006;
Apperly et al., 2007). It has therefore been taken for granted that
both forms of information processing rely on one working mem-
ory system. However, brain imaging research suggests that social
cognitive and non-social cognitive information processing rely
on distinct brain systems (Kampe et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2005;
Mitchell et al., 2005; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007), suggesting that
SWM and cognitive working memory (CWM) may rely on dis-
tinct, though perhaps correlated, neural mechanisms. Second, the
dominant paradigms in social neuroscience show little-to-no vari-
ability in the amount of information they require, or working
memory demand (Fletcher et al., 1995; Brunet et al., 2000; Walter
et al., 2004). The past decade of research has focused on which
brain regions engage in a binary fashion to social relative to non-
social cognitive tasks. While this has been useful in delineating
brain networks engaged in social cognition, it has overshadowed
the possibility that these systems are sensitive to SWM demands
and show variability in activation across individuals.
We recently reported findings suggesting that SWM may rely on
both social cognition and canonical working memory brain net-
works (Meyer et al., 2012). Here, we review evidence in support of
the idea that demanding social cognition may require SWM, that
individual differences in neural responses to SWM may explain
variance in individual differences in social cognitive ability, and
suggest that research on SWM may help address remaining gaps
or untested assumptions in social cognition research, as well create
novel ways to improve social cognitive function.
WHAT IS SOCIAL WORKING MEMORY?
Social working memory is working memory for social cognitive
information, and will tend to engage during a process referred
to as “mentalizing.” Mentalizing is an umbrella term used to
describe the ability to think about mental states, traits, beliefs, and
intentions (Frith and Frith, 2003). Arguably, complex mentalizing
depends on some form of working memory: when considering
and attributing mental states to the self and others, people must
access, maintain, and manipulate information about the person
(self or other) and draw some sort of conclusion about their
related mental state. This is similar to the idea that when solving
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a math problem, people must access and hold representations
of the numbers to be manipulated in order to derive an answer
(Siegler, 1987, 1988; Geary and Burlingham-Dubree, 1989; Geary
and Wiley, 1991; Geary et al., 1993; Ackerman, 1996; Timmermans
and Van Lieshshout, 2003; Bjorklund et al., 2004) – and indeed,
arithmetic computation is inextricably linked to working memory
(e.g., Geary et al., 2004; Wu et al., 2008; Meyer et al., 2010).
Behavioral evidence for SWM comes from studies showing
that as social cognitive load increases, mentalizing performance
decreases (Kinderman et al., 1998; Rutherford, 2004; Apperly
et al., 2007), a behavioral profile consistent with working memory
research which suggests that working memory is a limited capac-
ity system (see; Miyake and Shah, 1999 for a review). For example,
adults show increased errors on mentalizing tasks as a function
of the number of embedded beliefs maintained (i.e., “Bob thinks
that John knew that Mary wanted to go to the shop”; Kinderman
et al., 1998). Although previously not specified as working mem-
ory tasks, such multiple embedding tasks could be conceived of
in terms of working memory processes. That is, a correct answer
to questions about what Bob thinks requires not only difficult
grammatical constructs, but also the active maintenance of belief
and desire representations for John and Mary. Likewise, dual-task
methodology has shown that performing mentalizing tasks while
simultaneously engaging in auditory (McKinnon and Mascovitch,
2007) and verbal working memory (Gilbert et al., 1988) decreases
accuracy on various kinds of mentalizing tasks (e.g., theory of
mind ToM, trait inference).
The guiding assumption of these approaches is that there is a
limited pool of working memory resources and depleting the pool,
either concurrently or prior to mentalizing, reduces the resources
available for performing the mentalizing task. In fact, the “cog-
nitive load” method in social cognition (i.e., manipulating CWM
demand concurrently or prior to performing a social cognition
task and measuring how load effects performance; Gilbert et al.,
1988) and the “strength models” of cognitive resources (i.e., that
there is one pool of limited resources supporting effortful cogni-
tion; Baumeister et al., 1998) seem to depend on this assumption.
An alternative hypothesis, however, is that these tasks reflect dif-
ferent patterns of working memory system exhaustion, although
both forms correspond with deteriorating mentalizing perfor-
mance (i.e., different means to the same end). In this scenario,
studies that ramp up social cognitive load may exhaust both a
specialized SWM system and general CWM system, whereas those
enhancing CWM demands may direct attention away from social
information processing mechanisms toward CWM mechanisms
(see Figure 1B). As will be shown in the subsequent section, brain
imaging evidence suggests that this alternative hypothesis may bet-
ter explain otherwise undetectable mechanistic differences guiding
similar behavioral performance in mentalizing across social and
non-social load manipulations.
MENTALIZING AND COGNITIVE WORKING MEMORY
RECRUIT DISTINCT NEUROCOGNITIVE NETWORKS
SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE MENTALIZING SYSTEM
Mentalizing, or thinking about the psychological characteris-
tics of others, whether it is thinking about their current mental
state (beliefs, desires, intentions) or psychological aspects of their
personality (traits), reliably recruits functional activation in the so-
called “mentalizing network” consisting of medial frontoparietal
regions [medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC); precuneus/posterior
cingulate cortex (PC/PCC) along with temporoparietal junction
(TPJ), temporal poles (TP), and posterior superior temporal sul-
cus (pSTS; Van Overwalle, 2009; Lieberman, 2010)]. This network
is recruited when people draw inferences about the mental states
of others either by assessing a person’s state of mind, the emo-
tional reactions they are likely to feel in response to particular
events, or the likely behaviors they will engage in based on their
intentions and current events (Kampe et al., 2003; German et al.,
2004; Walter et al., 2004; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007). This network is
also reliably recruited when people think about the psychological
traits of other people, such as when they are learning about and
judging someone’s personality (Mitchell et al., 2004, 2005; Har-
ris et al., 2005; Heberlein and Saxe, 2005). Consistent with these
functional findings, recent findings using structural brain imag-
ing suggest that individual differences in the gray matter structures
of the mentalizing system correlates with social cognitive compe-
tence and even social network size (Powell et al., 2010; Lewis et al.,
2011).
Importantly, the functional MRI studies investigating mental-
izing compare brain activation in response to easy social cognitive
tasks (e.g., deciding whether adjectives like “charming” could be
used to describe people) relative to easy non-social tasks (e.g.,
deciding whether adjectives like “orange” could describe objects).
Prior to our study (Meyer et al., 2012), no research had exam-
ined whether and how these regions respond to increases in
the amount of social information to be maintained or manipu-
lated during mentalizing. As will be revealed in the subsequent
sections, hypothesizing how the mentalizing system may respond
to increasing demands in social cognition is not straightfor-
ward, and examining this question may reveal interesting insights
into the functional dynamics of the mentalizing and CWM
networks.
THE NEUROCOGNITIVE NETWORK SUPPORTING CWM AND ITS
ANTI-CORRELATION WITH THE MENTALIZING NETWORK
Despite the lack of research on SWM, there is a longstanding
line of research on CWM, which offers a backdrop for examining
whether the mentalizing system may respond similarly to regions
supporting CWM. In general, CWM is the ability to maintain and
manipulate increasing amounts of information at once. In typ-
ical studies of CWM, participants are instructed to maintain or
manipulate spatial information (the location of shapes) or verbal
information (the order of letters in a string; Smith et al., 1996;
D’Esposito et al., 1999) and brain imaging studies using these
paradigms consistently report activation in a lateral frontopari-
etal network consisting primarily of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), lateral parietal cortex, as well as supplementary motor
area (SMA; Goldman-Rakic, 1994; D’Esposito et al., 1999; Rypma
et al., 1999; Wager and Smith, 2003). Specifically, activity in these
regions increases as the amount of information in CWM increases
(Braver et al., 1997; Rypma et al., 1999).
Importantly though, the neural regions previously implicated
in CWM are often thought to be functionally distinct from the
brain regions associated with mentalizing (medial frontoparietal
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FIGURE 1 | Models of how the CWM and mentalizing regions respond to working memory demand. (A) Reflects the possibility that mentalizing regions
do not support any working memory. (B) Reflects the possibility that mentalizing regions do not support non-social working memory, but do support social
working memory.
cortex, TPJ, TP, and pSTS; e.g., Fox et al., 2005). In fact, brain
regions associated with mentalizing seem to interfere with cog-
nitive demands, including working memory (McKiernan et al.,
2003; Greicius and Menon, 2004; Li et al., 2007; Anticevic et al.,
2010; Metzak et al., 2011). That is, while increased activation in
the lateral/SMA network supports cognitive processing, regions in
the mentalizing network decrease in activation during cognitive
processing. These regions have become known (outside of social
neuroscience) as the “default network” (Raichle et al., 2001), so
named because they are highly active when participants are pas-
sively resting in the scanner (i.e., by default), but show reduced
activation, or deactivation, during task performance. Figure 2
shows the anatomical regions associated with the mentalizing net-
work, the default network, and their overlap based on the results
from a term-based meta-analysis software, Neurosynth (Yarkoni
et al., 2011).
A reliable finding is that the default network and lateral fron-
toparietal network show an inverse pattern of activation both at
rest (Shulman et al., 1997; Greicius and Menon, 2004; Fox et al.,
2005) and during CWM (Greicius et al., 2003; McKiernan et al.,
2003; Metzak et al., 2011). For example, one study manipulated
CWM demand with easy, medium, and difficult auditory detec-
tion CWM trials. Not only did the CWM network show parametric
increases in activation, but also regions in the default network
showed parametric decreases in activation, as a function of CWM
trial difficulty (McKiernan et al., 2003). There is also evidence that
failure to deactivate regions in the default network during CWM
tasks interferes with activating the canonical working memory
regions (Greicius and Menon, 2004) and may contribute to poorer
cognitive performance (Weissman et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2008).
While these and related findings could suggest that the default net-
work does not support working memory and instead its activation
interferes with working memory processes, another possibility is
that this network can support working memory when the con-
tent is social, and hence anti-correlations with canonical work-
ing memory systems is limited to non-social forms of working
memory.
Taken together, findings from three literatures offer different
pieces of information relevant to understanding SWM. First, social
cognitive neuroscience research finds that a specific set of brain
regions activate in response to mentalizing (i.e., medial frontopari-
etal cortex, TPJ, TP, and pSTS; the“mentalizing network”). Second,
the CWM literature shows that a different set of brain regions
(lateral frontoparietal network and SMA, the “canonical work-
ing memory network”) support CWM. Specifically, these regions
show a parametric response to CWM demands, which provides a
possible pattern to look for when examining which brain regions
support SWM. Third, extensive research on the default network
shows that there is a network of regions whose functional activa-
tion is tightly coupled, most robust at rest, and deactivates during
demanding cognition, including CWM. What is fascinating about
this literature in the context of SWM is that this default network
is anatomically similar to the mentalizing network. Whether and
how the mentalizing and CWM networks could support SWM is
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FIGURE 2 | Social working memory task.
an intriguing theoretical question, which will be addressed in the
subsequent section.
MENTALIZING UNDER CWM AND SWM LOAD
Most social neuroscience research on mentalizing has used rela-
tively simple mentalizing tasks. When performance measures are
reported in fMRI studies of social cognition, they are often near
ceiling (Fletcher et al., 1995; Brunet et al., 2000; Walter et al., 2004),
implying relative ease. In fact, even 4 year olds achieve high lev-
els of performance on many of the fMRI-based social cognition
tasks given to adults (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Sommer et al.,
2007). Therefore, whether the mentalizing network supports com-
plex social cognition, like SWM, remained untested. However, four
studies have explored how juggling increased non-social infor-
mation, or CWM, affects mentalizing system activation during
social cognition (den Ouden et al., 2005; Kellermann et al., 2011;
Rameson et al., 2012; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012a). For exam-
ple, requiring participants to maintain a string of numbers while
empathizing with others’ emotional states relative to empathiz-
ing without maintaining numbers showed reduced activation in
several regions of the mentalizing system [e.g., dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (DMPFC), MPFC,VMPFC, PC, pSTS, TP; Rameson
et al., 2012]. A similar pattern of results extends to mental state
inferences: requiring participants to maintain a complex sequence
of digits (e.g., 937–6542) relative to a simple sequence of digits
(e.g., 888–8888) while determining characters’ intentions showed
reduced activation in mentalizing regions (DMPFC, TP; Spunt
and Lieberman, 2012a).
While these studies show that mentalizing regions reduce acti-
vation in response to CWM, they cannot speak to how the mental-
izing network responds to working memory demands with social
cognitive content. Given the fact that this system supports men-
talizing, but also deactivates in response to canonical working
memory demand (McKiernan et al., 2003; Metzak et al., 2011), it is
not entirely clear how the mentalizing network would respond to
working memory load in the social domain (i.e., social load). For
example, one possibility is that mentalizing regions do not support
effortful processing at all. If this were the case, then mentalizing
regions may be insensitive, or even reduce activation, in response
to demanding social cognition like SWM. This would be consistent
with default network characterizations of brain regions associated
with mentalizing, whose activation to date has been portrayed as
reflecting non-effortful cognitive processing, and even postulated
to interfere with effortful cognition (Sonuga-Barke and Castel-
lanos, 2007; Figure 1A). An alternative possibility, however, is
that mentalizing regions are specialized to respond to demands
in social cognition. Thus, while they reduce activation in response
to CWM and other non-social forms of effortful cognition, they
also increase activation in response to SWM and other forms of
effortful social cognition (Figure 1B). If this were the case, then
mentalizing regions do not support non-effortful cognition per se
as suggested by the default network literature, but instead support
effortful social cognition.
To test these competing hypotheses, we recently examined how
the mentalizing regions respond to SWM (Meyer et al., 2012). We
developed a delayed-response working memory task that varied
working memory load in the social domain on a trial-by-trial
basis (Figure 3). During scanning, participants completed tri-
als in which they encoded names of two, three, or four of their
friends, mentally ranked their friends along a trait dimension dur-
ing a delay period, and answered a true/false question about the
rankings. Parametric analyses showed increases in the mentalizing
system (DMPFC, PC/PCC, TPJ) and canonical working memory
system [DLPFC, superior parietal lobule (SPL), SMA] as a func-
tion of the number of friends considered along a trait dimension
during delay and probe-response periods (Figures 4A,B). Our
data are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that the mental-
izing regions can support effortful social cognition. Additionally,
the CWM network also showed parametric increases in activa-
tion suggesting that although these two networks often operate
inversely, in the context of SWM they may operate in conjunction.
Thus, there may be two separable networks supporting SWM:
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FIGURE 3 | Results from a term-based search on Neurosynth, which
synthesizes fMRI data extracted from published articles.The
mentalizing network, shown in red, was created with the search term
“mentalizing.” The default network, shown in yellow, was created with the
search term “default.” White areas indicate overlapping areas of activation.
the mentalizing network, which may be specifically involved in
SWM and the canonical working memory network, which may be
involved in all known forms of working memory.
These results suggest there might be multiple routes by which
secondary tasks inducing CWM or SWM load might impair pri-
mary task performance in cognitive or social domains. Given that
mentalizing regions commonly involved in social cognition are
typically deactivated during effortful cognitive tasks, social load
might impair cognitive task performance to the extent that there is
negative connectivity between mentalizing and canonical working
memory regions. In this hypothesized case, SWM load would not
deplete canonical working memory resources, but instead suppress
them to the extent to which the two systems are wired to compete.
In contrast, non-social cognitive load might deplete canonical
working memory controlled processing resources directly. Under
many conditions, these two mechanisms might produce similar
behavioral outcomes as a function of working memory load, but
under others they may not. Connectivity-based suppression ver-
sus within system overloading might, for instance, lead to different
performance outcomes immediately after the competing demand
is eliminated. Future research should examine how the social or
cognitive content of secondary tasks differentially lead to resource
depletion and whether different neural markers of depletion lead
to distinct behavioral responses.
These results are also consistent with a handful of recent stud-
ies, which have found that in certain contexts the default net-
work and lateral frontoparietal regions can increase activation in
conjunction (see; Spreng, 2012 for review). For example, these
networks show positive functional connectivity when participants
plan future, personal goals such as“how to find a good job”(Spreng
et al., 2010), and co-activation during personal simulations that
are goal oriented (Gerlach et al., 2011), creative idea generation
(Ellamil et al., 2012), and mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009;
Christoff, 2012). These studies may link to SWM in a variety of
ways. On the one hand, each of these studies involve generat-
ing internal, subjective content, and it makes sense to think that
SWM does as well: thinking about mental states requires the inter-
nal generation of mental state content. On the other hand, each
of these past studies may involve social cognition. Even during
mind-wandering, we may spontaneously think about our own and
others intentions. Another interesting future question to explore
is whether one function of the default network is to process social
information, and its more natural, externally valid relationship
with the lateral frontoparietal network is co-activation to bet-
ter allow humans to navigate their social world. If this were the
case, then past studies showing anti-correlations with the lateral
frontoparietal system may be incidental to paradigms that engage
demanding cognition for externally invalid stimuli.
While both the mentalizing and CWM networks showed
parametric increases in response to SWM load, we found that
only parametric increases in the mentalizing network corre-
lated with a standardized measure of perspective-taking abil-
ity (Figures 4C,D). Specifically, individuals higher in trait
perspective-taking were more likely to show load-dependent para-
metric increases in MPFC (Brodmann area 10), perhaps suggesting
that individuals with greater perspective-taking ability are more
able to exert intentional effort in MPFC. Interestingly, this is the
only region of the frontal cortex known to be disproportionately
larger in humans than other primates after scaling for body size
(Semendeferi et al., 2001). In humans, individual differences in
MPFC size correlate with social cognitive competence and social
network size (Powell et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2011). To tease apart
the causal nature of these kinds of findings, a recent study mea-
sured macaque cortex size prior to and after living in groups of 1–7
macaques (Sallet et al., 2011). Rostral prefrontal cortex, a region
suggested to be homologous to human BA 10, showed significant
increases in gray matter structure as a function of larger group
size. Thus, to the extent that the macaque findings parallel human
findings, increasing social cognitive demands may cause growth in
brain structures like BA 10. Our functional finding and the pre-
vious structural findings in humans and macaques dovetail nicely
with the social brain hypothesis, which emphasizes that demand-
ing social information processing may have been critical in the
expansion of prefrontal cortex size in humans (Dunbar, 1998).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN SWM RESEARCH
PROBING THE MENTALIZING SYSTEMWITH SWM PARADIGMS
Together, functional and structural findings implicate the mental-
izing network in social cognition. Yet the component process each
region plays in mentalizing is still an open question, although some
speculations have been suggested. In a recent review of mentaliz-
ing brain imaging studies, Lieberman (2010) found that across 45
different studies/tasks, DMPFC (BA 8/9) was reported in 91% of
studies, whereas TPJ was reported in 59%, TP was reported in 52%,
pSTS, and PC/PCC each 39%, and MPFC (BA 10) in 33%, suggest-
ing that DMPFC may play a broad role across different kinds of
mentalizing. Interestingly, the second most reported region from
the meta-analysis was the TPJ, whose role in mentalizing is still
heavily debated. For example, some researchers argue that TPJ acti-
vation during mentalizing, over and above attentional demands,
reflects social cognitive processing (Young et al., 2010), while oth-
ers argue that TPJ activation during mentalizing may entirely
reflect attention orientation, rather than mentalizing-content-
specific computations (Mitchell, 2008). The TPs are highly active
when viewing faces and names of familiar people (Sugiura et al.,
2006) yet are also associated with semantic knowledge (Schmolck
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FIGURE 4 | Parametric increases in response to SWM. (A) shows
parametric results (i.e., increases in activation as a function of thinking about
2, 3, or 4 friends) from whole-brain analysis during the delay period. (B)
Shows parametric results (i.e., increases in activation as a function of thinking
about 2, 3, or 4 friends) from whole-brain analysis during the probe-response
period. (C) Parametric increases in activation as a function of social load
during the delay period that correlates with trait perspective-taking scores. (D)
Graphical display of the correlation shown in (C).
et al., 2002; Bayley and Squire, 2005) and have been proposed to
underlie social norm,rule-based or script knowledge guiding men-
talizing (e.g., Lambon Ralph et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009).
The pSTS, on the other hand, appears to be sensitive to biolog-
ical motion (e.g., Noguchi et al., 2005), which may help guide
inferences about people’s mental states (Baumeister et al., 1998).
Importantly, not only are all of these interpretations rela-
tively speculative, none of them attempt to make sense of these
regions’ interactive roles in mentalizing. A SWM framework may
help unravel the specific component processes these regions may
play in mentalizing. For example, one working memory model
suggests that a general, or “central executive” system orches-
trates the holding of mental representations in mind, while
content-specific sub-systems grounded in subdivisions of the
parietal cortex code for visuo-spatial and lexical content that is
fed forward to the central executive system (Baddeley, 2002).
Likewise, demanding social cognitive processing in general, and
SWM in particular, may rely on the DMPFC to function as
a social-central executive system, whereas TPJ, TP, pSTS, and
MPFC may function as SWM sub-systems that feed forward task-
specific content. Alternatively, other working memory models
suggest that rather than specialized systems dedicated to hold-
ing content-specific information in mind, working memory is
supported by reactivation of previously stored long-term mem-
ories (Anderson, 1983; Cowan, 1995; Ruchkin et al., 2003; Lewis-
Peacock and Postle, 2008). It seems possible that mentalizing
region activation during SWM may reflect reactivation of pre-
viously stored episodic memories, a possibility which could be
explored in the future with techniques such multivariate pattern
analysis.
In addition to open questions surrounding functional roles of
regions within the mentalizing system, the general operating char-
acteristics of this network (i.e., not just that regions respond to
certain stimuli, but how they respond, for example as a linear, qua-
dratic, or cubic function) remains almost entirely unexplored in
social neuroscience. Nonetheless, it has become increasingly clear
that complex cognitive processes likely emerge from the interac-
tions between and within brain regions that compose networks
showing specific functional profiles (Bressler and Menon, 2010).
As described previously, there is an overlap between regions of the
mentalizing network and one of the core large-scale brain net-
works typically referred to as the default network (Gusnard et al.,
2001; Spreng et al., 2009). Thus, an intriguing future direction
for mentalizing research is to move beyond the region-by-region
approach and explore how these regions’ functional properties
interact as a dynamic network to support mentalizing. SWM
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paradigms may be particularly useful in this endeavor, as net-
work analyses on subtle manipulations in the mentalizing-content
managed in SWM (traits versus beliefs, familiar versus unfamiliar
others) may show unique functional relationships across regions
within the mentalizing system.
Finally, in everyday life, SWM will often require not only jug-
gling internal mental states, but also external characteristics, such
as emotional expression, identity, and action understanding. Stud-
ies on working memory for facial identity tend to find increased
activation in the fusiform face area (FFA) in addition to activa-
tion increases in canonical working memory regions (Druzgal
and D’Esposito, 2001, 2003). However, in many of these stud-
ies, only facial identity is maintained during a delay. In one study
that required the maintenance of facial identity and emotion, the
FFA did not show a delay period response. Instead, the amygdala,
hippocampus, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex showed sustained
increases during the working memory delay period for both iden-
tity and emotion trial types (LoPresti et al., 2008). LoPresti et al.
(2008) suggested that the FFA may facilitate simple forms of facial
working memory, but that it may not be sufficient for maintaining
more complex facial information in working memory. An interest-
ing future direction will be to expand on the LoPresti et al. (2008)
findings by combining the maintenance of mental states along
with emotions and identities to examine how brain regions previ-
ously implicated in facial processing interact with the mentalizing
system during SWM.
In the context of action identification, a large literature impli-
cates the mirror neuron system, which is neuroanatomically dis-
tinct from the mentalizing system, in simulating others’ minds by
decoding their behavioral intentions (Aron et al., 1992; Di Pellegri-
ono et al., 1992; Keysers and Gazzola, 2010; Spunt and Lieberman,
2012b). To date, no study has examined the potential work-
ing memory properties of the mirror neuron system, although
one study has demonstrated that the mirror neuron system may
engage more automatically than the mentalizing system (Spunt
and Lieberman, 2012a). One interesting possibility is that the mir-
ror neuron and mentalizing system may differ in their working
memory properties and future research will be needed to disen-
tangle how we maintain, manipulate, and bind representations of
actions and mental states during SWM.
INFORMING THE DEBATE BETWEEN MENTALIZING AND EXECUTIVE
FUNCTIONS
Mentalizing research has its roots in developmental and compar-
ative psychology that, for several decades, has examined “ToM,”
or the ability to represent internal mental states (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978). A fundamental question in this line of research
surrounds how humans are able to understand that people have
internal mental states that often times are distinct from our own
subjective experience. A longstanding debate in the ToM litera-
ture surrounds whether a ToM requires executive functions, or the
suite of cognitive abilities including working memory, planning,
attention, problem solving, inhibition, and mental flexibility. As
it stands, researchers asking this question tend to adhere to one
of two sides of a debate. Many suggest that ToM requires execu-
tive function ability, including working memory (Hala et al., 2003).
Evidence in support of this position comes from (1) developmental
findings showing that children on average do not pass the false
belief task (a measure of ToM; see; Wimmer and Perner, 1983)
until 4 years of age (Gopnik and Astington, 1988), which coincides
with the development of working memory (Carlson and Moses,
2001; Tamm et al., 2002); (2) performance on working memory
tasks correlates with ToM ability in children (Gordon and Olson,
1998); and (3) adult performance on ToM tasks decreases as a
function of task demand (McKiernan et al., 2003; German and
Hehman, 2006; Apperly et al., 2007).
Evidence in support of the other side of the debate – that ToM
is a specific conceptual knowledge that does not necessitate exec-
utive function – (for a discussion, see; Bloom and German, 2000)
garners support from brain imaging studies showing that ToM
relies on mentalizing regions, rather than brain regions associ-
ated with executive function (Baumeister et al., 1998; Lieberman,
2010). In addition, neuropsychological evidence, particularly from
research on individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), is
consistent with the idea that ToM is distinct from executive func-
tions. Individuals with ASD show deficits in mentalizing, including
ToM. However, some evidence suggests that these deficits can per-
sist while executive functions including working memory remain
intact (Ozonoff and Strayer, 2001). In addition, children under
the age of 4 show improved performance on ToM tasks when cog-
nitive demands are reduced (Lewis and Osborne, 1990; Wellman
and Bartsch, 1998; Yazdi et al., 2006), suggesting that the role of
executive functions including working memory in ToM may be an
artifact of the arbitrary cognitive demands required in false-belief
reasoning per se, not ToM in particular.
In both sides of the debate, it is assumed that ToM and exec-
utive functions are mutually exclusive. An alternative possibility,
however, is that mentalizing requires a specific social executive
function system, which is distinct from the domain-general execu-
tive function system, and is designed to handle increasing amounts
of beliefs, traits, and mental states. Consistent with this sugges-
tion, the mentalizing network, which supports ToM, was found to
increase linearly as a function of SWM load, as did the CWM sys-
tem (Meyer et al., 2012). It is possible that parametric increases
in the CWM system reflect domain-general working memory
demands in the SWM task (i.e., the temporal and spatial ordering
of names and/or verbal rehearsal). However, the mentalizing-
specific demands (i.e., thinking about the traits of an increasing
amount of people) are likely supported by the functionally dis-
tinct mentalizing system. In the case of ASD, the domain-general
executive functions may be intact, while the domain-specific social
executive system may be compromised. Likewise, extant ToM tasks
may vary in manipulating social versus cognitive demands and
may in turn differentially exhaust one or both executive systems.
SOCIAL COGNITIVE PATHOLOGIES, SOCIAL COGNITIVE ABILITY, AND
INTERVENTIONS
Many psychiatric conditions including schizophrenia, social anx-
iety, and ASD show dual or differential deficits in social cognition
and working memory. Understanding how the mentalizing and
CWM networks contribute to SWM may offer important insight
into how these systems contribute to various psychological disor-
ders and the kinds of interventions that might benefit them. For
example, working memory and ToM are impaired in patients with
www.frontiersin.org December 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 571 | 7
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schizophrenia (Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Pickup and Frith, 2001;
Couture et al., 2006). Individuals with social anxiety show work-
ing memory deficits, but enhanced working memory for socially
salient words (Amir and Bomyea, 2011). Similarly, a hallmark of
autism is the impaired ability to relate to and take the perspec-
tive of others (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Dawson and Fernald,
1987). Interestingly, research on working memory capacity in indi-
viduals with ASD is mixed (Bennetto et al., 1996; Russell et al.,
1996; Ozonoff and Strayer, 2001; Williams et al., 2006), with some
research finding that working memory capacity is relatively intact
in high-functioning individuals (Bennetto et al., 1996; Ozonoff
and Strayer, 2001). It is possible that social cognitive deficits
in these and other disorders may be better characterized with
the inclusion of a social cognition task like SWM that varies in
difficulty level.
Outside of psychopathology, SWM capacity may also explain
variance in healthy individual’s social cognitive abilities and
broader “social intelligence.” If, as suggested by Bower (1975), the
purpose of working memory“is to build up and maintain an inter-
nal model of the immediate environment and what has been hap-
pening in our world,” then SWM should be similarly significant.
In daily life, much of what one would qualify as “happening” that
should require working memory comprises information about
people’s psychological characteristics, their mental states, and the
relation of these across individuals. On the cognitive side, working
memory capacity and lateral frontoparietal activity has been linked
to cognitive abilities ranging from math and reading to IQ (Dane-
man and Carpenter, 1980; Conway et al., 2003; Geary et al., 2004).
Similarly, with our SWM paradigm, we identified regions that
increased with social load and showed a positive association with
self-reported perspective-taking ability (Davis, 1983). Although
both lateral and medial frontoparietal networks increased with
load in this task, only medial frontoparietal regions showed signifi-
cant correlations with self-reported perspective-taking ability (see
Figures 4B,C). Additionally, medial frontoparietal regions only
showed this effect when load-level was taken into account. Gen-
eral responses, collapsing across load-level, showed no correlation
with trait perspective-taking ability. Perspective-taking is consid-
ered an effortful social cognitive process (Davis et al., 1996; Epley
et al., 2004) and greater self-reported perspective-taking is asso-
ciated with better social functioning (Davis, 1983). This finding
is therefore consistent with the suggestion that individual differ-
ences in medial frontoparietal activation during SWM may explain
variance in real-world social cognitive ability.
Paralleling recent findings with working memory (Klingberg
et al., 2005; Jaeggi et al., 2008, 2011), it is also plausible that
SWM training could benefit the everyday social cognitive success
of individuals with social cognitive deficits and even individuals
with normal social cognitive performance. A handful of recent
studies, while controversial (for critical reviews of WM training
transfer effects see: Melby-Lervåg and Hulme, 2012; Redick et al.,
2012; Shipstead et al., 2012), suggest that working memory train-
ing not only improves working memory, but these improvements
generalize to improved cognitive reasoning and fluid intelligence
(Klingberg et al., 2005; Jaeggi et al., 2008, 2011). For exam-
ple, after completing a working memory intervention, children
with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) showed
improvements in working memory capacity, response inhibition,
and complex reasoning. In addition, the participants’ parents
reported that their children’s ADHD symptoms improved both
post-training and after a 3 month follow-up assessment (Kling-
berg et al., 2005). Similarly, Jaeggi et al. (2008) found that in
psychologically healthy adults with normal IQ, working memory
training corresponded with improvements in fluid intelligence,
or the ability to reason and solve new problems independent of
previously acquired knowledge. While preliminary, these findings
suggest that working memory ability may be plastic, and that train-
ing working memory may help to improve other forms of general
cognitive reasoning. By extension, SWM training may be a way to
improve both SWM (i.e., how many people can someone think
about at once) and other forms of social cognitive reasoning (i.e.,
perspective-taking) in both atypical and typical populations.
Another interesting hypothesis related to enhancing cognitive
ability is the potentially greater efficiency of SWM, relative to
non-SWM. Other cognitive operations are facilitated when put
in a social context. For example, performance on the Wason card
selection task, a measure of conditional reasoning, improves when
conditional rules are based on social contracts relative to non-
social contingencies (see Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). Similarly,
because social cognition may come more readily to individuals,
engaging SWM may facilitate recruitment of the lateral frontopari-
etal working memory network via the mentalizing system, and
improve working memory performance.
CONCLUSION
Working memory research has focused on the basic building
blocks that allow us to handle representations of our imme-
diate environment, but has neglected to incorporate relevant
social information that makes up much of our mental processing.
Research reviewed here suggests that demanding mentalizing can
be conceived as requiring SWM. Interestingly, the picture that is
beginning to emerge is that SWM may rely on two functionally dis-
tinct neurocognitive networks: The mentalizing network and the
canonical working memory network. While the mentalizing net-
work reduces activation under CWM load, it appears to increase
activation, alongside the canonical working memory system, while
under SWM load. These findings have theoretical implications for
the functional properties of the default network and the neural sys-
tems that support social cognition, as well as practical implications
for future research in social cognitive training.
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